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After the Death of Inflation: Will 




Declining inflation rates might have negative consequences for tax revenues. Phenomena such as 
the inflationary bracket creep in a progressive income tax system do not work any longer. With this 
background, the paper analyses the extent of fiscal drag for OECD countries since 1965. Some 
consideration of the role of money illusion and indexation in this context lays the theoretical base. 
A framework is presented that allows for the classification of fiscal structures with regard to the 
type of fiscal drag. The subsequent econometric panel analysis is performed for total and 
disaggregated government revenues. The results back theoretical considerations of inflation’s 
impact on different kinds of taxes, which tends to be positive for individual income taxes and social 
security contributions and is negative for corporate income taxation. The paper concludes that both 
declining inflation and changing tax structures limit the potential for future fiscal drag. 
JEL classification: H20, E63. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, politicians have liked to ascribe lower tax revenue growth rates 
to globalisation and the consequences of tax competition. Less attention is paid 
to another possible explanation: inflation rates have decreased markedly in 
industrial countries. Countries with formerly high long-run average rates of 
inflation have succeeded in reducing them to levels close to zero. Although it 
might be premature to speak about the ‘death of inflation’, it is hard to imagine, 
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for industrial countries in the foreseeable future, the return of inflation rates 
close to the levels of the 1970s. In Europe, traditional high-inflation countries 
have entered EMU and are subject to a monetary regime that does not allow for 
an easy way back into inflation. 
The achievement of low or even zero inflation rates can be relevant for the 
development of real government revenues. While the seigniorage dimension has 
attracted attention for many years (Phelps (1973) or, more recently, in the EMU 
context, Gros and Vandille (1995)), the impact of price stability on tax revenues 
has been neglected. Studies such as Jaksch (1990) and Sadka (1991) deal with 
cases of very high inflation. Persson, Persson and Svensson (1998) look into the 
Swedish case in one specific year (1994) and actually find a substantial impact 
of inflation on real tax revenues. So far, there is a lack of studies dealing with the 
long-run consequences of disinflation for revenues in industrial countries as a 
whole. 
The phenomenon of inflation — even at a moderate level — boosting tax 
revenues is well known under the term ‘fiscal drag’. It is, however, important to 
differentiate between real and nominal types of fiscal drag (Ursprung and 
Wettstein, 1992). The nominal type of fiscal drag can work in the following way. 
With a progressive tax system and in the absence of perfect indexation, inflation 
shifts taxpayers into tax brackets with higher marginal tax rates. This so-called 
‘bracket creep’ leads to rising tax–income ratios. Since, with positive nominal 
growth, this relationship holds even in the absence of any real growth, the 
phenomenon can be called ‘nominal fiscal drag’. 
The real type of fiscal drag does not depend on inflation. ‘Real fiscal drag’ 
exists if the tax–income ratio reacts positively to increasing real income. Perfect 
indexation of tax brackets will not neutralise this type of fiscal drag. A perfectly 
indexed tax system that is nevertheless progressive in real terms leads to rising 
tax–income ratios with positive real growth. 
The extent to which the era of low inflation will be a restriction for the 
revenue side of OECD budgets will depend on the existence of both types of 
fiscal drag. If it turns out that indexation has spread widely since the inflationary 
expectations of the 1970s, the death of inflation would make no difference for 
government revenues. Revenue constraints would then depend on the existence 
of real fiscal drag and future real growth rates. 
With this background, the study aims to find evidence for both types of fiscal 
drag. The econometric analysis is based on panel regressions for OECD 
countries from 1972 to 1996. Combining cross-section and time-series 
information is preferable to looking merely at the characteristics of a given tax 
system for a certain point in time (as was done for Sweden by Persson, Persson 
and Svensson (1998)). This static approach fails to take into account the fact that 
the tax system is endogenous itself and that changes to the system are probably 
driven also by the extent of inflation and real growth. There can be a substantial 
difference between the degree of de lege indexation and de facto indexation Will Fiscal Drag Survive? 
529 
(Padoa Schioppa Kostoris, 1993), where the latter takes into account 
discretionary changes of tax rules that happen in the political process as a 
reaction to inflation. The German case is an illustrative example. While any 
formal indexation is absent in the income tax system due to a negative view on 
indexation in the German legal system, there have been regular adjustments to 
tax brackets. The constitutional court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, has played 
a crucial role in introducing partial indexation by forcing the tax legislator to 
make tax-exempt the subsistence level, which is calculated on a real basis. Thus, 
in spite of the complete absence of any formal indexation in German tax tables, 
there exists today a considerable extent of de facto indexation. 
The results in this paper reveal marked differences in the relevance of fiscal 
drag — both with regard to types of taxes and with regard to countries. A 
striking result is that the existence of nominal fiscal drag is concentrated in the 
countries of the Euro zone. The results allow important insights for the 
consequences of ongoing tax reforms in industrial countries.  
The analysis starts, in Section II, by summarising theoretical considerations 
of the impact of inflation and growth on different kinds of taxes. Some 
descriptive statistics are presented in Section III, both along the time and along 
the cross-section dimension. Subsequently, Section IV introduces the analytical 
framework that allows the measurement of the existence of both nominal and 
real fiscal drag. The econometric analysis is presented in Section V. Section VI, 
finally, looks at the policy conclusions arising from these findings. 
II. MONEY ILLUSION AND FISCAL DRAG 
For economic thinking, it is not very pleasant to accept the relevance of nominal 
fiscal drag, since it implies the existence of some form of money illusion in the 
political system. If voters think purely in real terms, it is hard to see why 
politicians could use inflation to impose larger real tax burdens on citizens. 
However, there is pervasive evidence of empirical psychology for widely 
spread money illusion in various different contexts: in people’s assessment of 
income, transactions, contracts and investments (Shafir, Diamond and Tversky, 
1997). Money illusion stands also as a central explanation for the phenomenon 
of nominal downward wage rigidity: workers and trade unions are more inclined 
to accept real wage cuts if nominal wages do not shrink (Akerlof, Dickens and 
Perry, 1996). 
Money illusion in the context of wages has a close relation to money illusion 
in the context of taxes. In the case of wages, workers are more likely to accept a 
cut in real wages with nominal wage stability than with nominal reductions in 
wages. The case of taxes and voters has an equivalent psychological structure: 
voters are more likely to accept an increasing real tax burden with a constant 
nominal net income than with a shrinking nominal net income. Fiscal Studies 
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The degree of money illusion might differ among countries and it will also 
depend on taxpayers’ experiences with inflation. With low inflation, the nominal 
view leads to judgements that are also reasonable in real terms. Awareness of the 
importance of the real view can be expected to increase with inflationary 
experience. People will start to notice that the nominal view is erroneous and 
leads to wrong decisions. In the tax context, this feeds the expectation that 
nominal fiscal drag might work better as long as inflation is a relatively new 
experience. After years of high and lasting inflation, the extent of nominal fiscal 
drag should decline: voters will think more and more in real terms, making it 
difficult for governments to conceal real tax increases under the monetary veil. 
The existence of money illusion in taxation will also depend on the type of 
tax and the type of taxpayer. So it might be less plausible to assume money 
illusion for companies, whose managers are trained to think in economic terms, 
than for private households, which probably have a lower degree of hard 
economic thinking. 
Apart from that, different taxes offer different scopes for the fiscal 
exploitation of money illusion. Exploitation is easy if inflation automatically 
increases real tax revenues without further political actions being required. This 
is the case for a progressive income tax with imperfect indexation of brackets. 
Oates (1988) subsumes such built-in tax increases, which are less clearly 
perceived than legislated changes, under the ‘fiscal illusion’ heading. Thus, in 
the case of bracket creeping, money illusion mixes with fiscal illusion and both 
create favourable conditions for a real budgetary expansion.  
Conditions are less favourable if inflation works the opposite way. Inflation 
automatically reduces real revenues for taxes with a considerable lag between 
the taxable event and the moment the tax is actually paid. The negative effect of 
inflation on real revenues for a tax with a significant collection lag is familiar as 
the Olivera–Tanzi effect (Olivera, 1967; Tanzi, 1977). In industrial countries, 
collection lags are probably relevant in the taxation of profits and property and 
less important in wage and indirect taxation or in regard to social security 
contributions, which are all paid soon after the taxable event. For taxes with 
collection lags, the existence of money illusion works in the opposite direction to 
individual income taxes: inflation makes it even more difficult to keep real tax 
payments constant because this would require a regular increase in nominal 
taxes. 
The highest degree of inflationary neutrality should be expected from 
proportional taxes without a significant collection lag. These conditions seem to 
be best fulfilled by transactions taxes such as VAT. Abstracting from 
hyperinflationary situations, neither bracket-creep nor collection-lag effects are 
at work that could pave the way for an inflationary impact. 
Regarding social security contributions, which have an increasing importance 
for the revenue side of the public sector in OECD countries, the arguments are 
somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, it can be argued that inflation should Will Fiscal Drag Survive? 
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reduce the real level (Alesina and Perotti, 1995): social security contributions are 
often paid as a flat rate of income up to a maximum value. Even if the latter is 
adjusted more or less regularly, inflation would dampen revenues. On the other 
hand, similar to income taxation, inflation together with money illusion could 
reduce political resistance to rising contributions since inflation stabilises 
nominal net incomes. Nevertheless, a difference from income taxation remains. 
In most countries, there is no automatism: real increases in social security 
contributions have to be realised by discretionary steps such as increasing 
contribution rates or ceilings. 
Real fiscal drag (i.e. the existence of a positive relation between tax revenues 
and real income on the macro level) cannot be explained by money illusion. It is 
also difficult to explain long-run real fiscal drag on a macro level simply by the 
progressivity of a tax system. Under distributive objectives, the real bracket 
creep has undesirable consequences (Steyn and Fourie, 1996): if real growth 
benefits all income classes, it will tend to shift an ever larger share of taxpayers 
into the top range of marginal tax rates. In the end, the progressive system would 
degenerate to a system with a flat proportional rate unable to achieve corrections 
of relative income distribution. Therefore, if voters and politicians like 
progression as an instrument to correct the relative income distribution, it can be 
expected that, in the political process, tax brackets will be adjusted for real 
growth. If these adjustments occur on a regular basis, the tax–income ratio is not 
affected by real growth. 
More adequate explanations for the existence of real fiscal drag originate 
from arguments being discussed in the context of Wagner’s Law, such as the 
median voter’s tax price and the income elasticity of public good demand (see, 
for example, Blankart  (1998, pp. 143–72)). Abstracting from other kinds of 
revenues, the government budget constraint implies that public expenditures 
must equal tax revenues. In this sense, saying that real fiscal drag exists for total 
taxes is almost synonymous to the statement that Wagner’s Law holds.
1 The 
empirical literature on the validity of Wagner’s Law is already broad (for a 
recent survey, see Peacock and Scott (2000)) and it is not a direct objective of 
this study to elaborate further on this issue. For the study of nominal fiscal drag, 
it is, however, necessary to have some understanding of the extent of real fiscal 
drag — the Wagnerian dimension — as a reference point. In order to know how 
inflation changes the growth of tax revenues, one has to know what the 
underlying relation between taxes and real income is. 
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III. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Annual data on tax revenues used in this study originate from OECD Revenue 
Statistics (see the Appendix for a full list of data sources). The following kinds 
of taxes are analysed (the numbers in parentheses are the line codes of OECD 
Revenue Statistics): 
•  total tax revenues including social security contributions; 
•  taxes on income, profits and capital gains (1000); also subgroups individuals 
(1100) and corporate (1200); 
•  social security contributions (2000); 
•  taxes on property (4000); 
•  taxes on goods and services (5000). 
Data for 23 OECD countries could be included in the descriptive analysis.
2 
Tables 1 and 2 offer a first view of the data both in a time and in a cross-section 
perspective. The time dimension (Table 1) shows different developments for 
different kinds of taxation. The overall increase in taxes cannot easily be 
explained by inflation. Although the inflationary 1970s were characterised by a 
substantial increase in taxes, the same is true for the second half of the low-
inflation 1960s. The picture would, however, be compatible with the existence of 
a combined real and nominal fiscal drag. In this sense, high real growth could 
explain the increase in tax levels during the 1960s, while the significant increase 
in inflation might have done the job in the following two decades. 
Differences between types of taxes partially correspond to the above 
considerations. Almost two-thirds of the increase in the individual income tax 
ratio over the whole period took place in the inflationary decade 1970–80 — a 
clear indication of the absence of perfect indexation provisions and the 
effectiveness of nominal fiscal drag in a progressive income tax system. Inflation 
did not boost revenues from corporate income, goods and services or property 
taxes: these tax ratios either hardly moved or even declined in the 1970s. Social 
security contributions show a behaviour quite similar to that of individual 
income taxation: inflation in the 1970s was paralleled by a marked increase, 
constituting almost half of the increase in social security contributions over the 
whole period 1965–96. 
Table 2 reveals some cross-section characteristics for OECD countries. For 
that purpose, countries are separated into two groups — those below and those 
above the median inflation rate or the median real growth rate. With nominal  
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TABLE 1 
OECD Inflation, Real Growth and Changes in Tax Ratios 























































































































Notes: Non-weighted means. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.  
 
TABLE 2 















Total taxes incl. 
social security 
0.1522  0.1094 0.0256 0.1377  0.1226  0.4559 
Income taxes, 
total 
0.0680  0.0401 0.0845 0.0585  0.0487  0.5563 
Income taxes, 
individual 
0.0537  0.0317 0.1862 0.0421  0.0414  0.9660 
Income taxes, 
corporate 
0.0095  0.0078 0.7839 0.0142  0.0039  0.0775 
Property  taxes  –0.0025  0.0031 0.1496 0.0016  –0.0007  0.5560 
Taxes on goods 
and services 
0.0342  0.0090 0.0114 0.0273  0.0154  0.2618 
Social security 
contributions 
0.0528  0.0605 0.5375 0.0496  0.0634  0.2701 
Notes: ‘High’ and ‘low’ refer to above and below median. Non-weighted means. Will Fiscal Drag Survive? 
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(real) fiscal drag, high-inflation (high-growth) countries should be characterised 
by larger tax increases than low-inflation (low-growth) countries. The ANOVA 
test for differences in the mean shows significant differences along the inflation 
dimension. Increases in the overall tax rate were more than 4 percentage points 
larger in high-inflation countries than in low-inflation countries, clearly 
indicating nominal fiscal drag in the cross-section perspective. The differences 
for income taxes and — unexpectedly — taxes on goods and services are also 
statistically significant (on the basis of a significance level of at least 10 per 
cent). Differences for the growth dimension are not significant with the 
exception of corporate income tax, where high-growth countries show larger 
increases in tax–income ratios. 
These results thus indicate that inflation may indeed be relevant for real tax 
levels. However, a more rigorous analysis is necessary to support this view, since 
these descriptive aggregate data conceal substantial differences between 
countries, they do not allow for a proper distinction between real and nominal 
fiscal drag and they do not control for possible changes in other variables 
relevant for government budgets. 
IV. THE CLASSIFICATION APPROACH 
The following framework, which is similar to that used in Padoa Schioppa 
Kostoris (1993), is helpful in differentiating precisely between nominal and real 
fiscal drag. The following equation serves to define both concepts and to relate 










The logic of these definitions is as follows. The first consideration is of a real 
nature and is based on the question of how a real expansion of income affects the 
tax ratio in the absence of any inflation. The second consideration is of a 
nominal nature and is based on the question of how a nominal expansion of 
income affects the tax ratio in the absence of any real growth. 
Real fiscal drag (real fiscal anti-drag) can be defined as the case where the 
tax–income ratio reacts positively (negatively) to an increase in nominal income 
holding the price level constant, i.e. β  > 0 (β  < 0). Real fiscal drag is absent if 
β  = 0. 
Nominal fiscal drag ( nominal fiscal anti-drag) exists if a purely nominal 
expansion of income — Y and P grow in the same proportion — induces a rising 
(decreasing) tax–income ratio. Nominal fiscal drag (nominal fiscal anti-drag) is 
thus associated with β  > γ  (β  < γ ). Nominal fiscal drag is absent if β  = γ . Thus,  




    Nominal fiscal drag 
   Absent Negative  Positive 
Absent  AA: β =0, ϑ =0 AN: β =0, ϑ <0 AP: β =0, ϑ >0 
Negative  NA: β <0, ϑ =0 NN: β <0, ϑ <0 NP: β <0,ϑ >0 
Real 
fiscal 
drag  Positive  PA: β >0, ϑ =0 PN: β >0, ϑ <0 PP:  β >0, ϑ >0 
 
the non-existence of nominal fiscal drag implies that the function determining 
the tax ratio must be homogeneous of degree zero in nominal income and the 
price level. 
With the help of these definitions, the classification scheme in Table 3 results 
from the combinations of possible real and nominal fiscal drag types. For this 
classification, the log-linear transformation of equation (1) is used: 




αβ ϑ =+ + , 
where ϑ  = β  – γ . 
The concept of indexation can now be related to this classification. Perfect 
indexation of a tax exists when inflation has no impact on the way real income 
affects the tax level (ϑ  = 0, i.e. cases AA, NA and PA). All other cases are 
characterised by imperfect indexation. Here, however, a further differentiation is 
necessary, depending on whether imperfect indexation leads to nominal fiscal 
drag of the same sign as or of the opposite sign to real fiscal drag.  
Incomplete indexation exists whenever a purely nominal expansion of income 
has an effect of the same sign as the effect resulting from a purely real 
expansion. In a system of real fiscal drag, this means β  > γ  (case PP). In a system 
of real fiscal anti-drag, this means β  < γ  (case NN). In both cases, de jure or de 
facto indexation procedures work that offer a partial compensation for the 
inflationary element of nominal growth in the determination of the real tax 
burden.  
Overindexation occurs whenever adjustments of taxes for inflation not only 
neutralise the effects of a merely nominal income expansion but even have an 
overcompensating character. In this situation, a purely nominal income 
expansion has an effect on taxes with the opposite sign to the effect resulting 
from a purely real expansion. Within a structure characterised by real fiscal drag, 
this means γ  > β  (case PN). With a structure characterised by real fiscal anti-
drag, overindexation implies γ  < β  (case NP). 
Cases AN and AP do not fit easily into this indexation context. Both cases are 
characterised by the fact that a merely nominal expansion of income has an 
effect on the tax–income ratio while a real expansion has not. These cases are Will Fiscal Drag Survive? 
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logically different from the preceding cases. While, in the above cases, the 
inflationary impact is associated with an underlying effect from a real income 
expansion that feeds into the nominal sphere, this real effect is absent here. 
V. FISCAL DRAG FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF TAXES AND 
COUNTRIES 
Equation (2) is open to econometric testing. However, some extensions are 
necessary. Tax revenues are not only affected by economic growth but also by 
many other variables, and it is important to control for at least the most 
important. With X being a vector of these control variables, u the random 
disturbance, i the country subscript and t the time subscript, the specification to 
test for fiscal drag in the context of a country panel (fixed effects) is 
(2')  ln ln ln ln
it it





αβ ϑ γ =+ + ++ . 
Guided by insights from the relevant literature (Mueller, 1989, ch. 17; Schulze 
and Ursprung, 1999) and data availability, the following variables are included 
in X:
3 
•  openness of the economy, measured as (Exports + Imports) / GDP, as an 
indicator of globalisation, which is expected to limit the scope for taxation; 
•  population density, as a proxy for fiscal preferences; 
•  ratio between the working-age population and total population, as a proxy for 
demography-driven effects on the budget; 
•  unemployment rate, as an indicator of labour market effects on taxation; 
•  ratio between the government consumption deflator and the private 
consumption deflator, as a proxy for the relative price of public goods — an 
important potential explanatory variable for the size of government. 
Standard econometric difficulties have to be overcome in performing this 
regression. First, in order to avoid obvious problems of simultaneity, most of the 
explanatory variables are included with a lag. Second, similar to the empirical 
approaches testing Wagner’s Law (Hayo, 1996), there is the danger of spurious 
regression since the variables are likely to be integrated. Indeed, standard unit 
root tests (Augmented Dickey Fuller, not reported) indicate the existence of unit 
roots both for the tax ratio and for some of the right-hand variables, so the   
 
                                                                                                                                    
3A number of further potential variables have been dropped from the regression due to insignificance. Among 
these were: share of left-wing parties in government, indicators of political instability, restrictions on 
international transactions and years since liberalisation of the capital account.  
 
TABLE 4 
Panel Estimation: OECD Countries,
a 1972–96 
Dependent variable: Change in tax–GDP ratio 
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Lagged change in relative price 















       
Adjusted R
2  0.075 0.058 0.116 0.044 0.008 0.038  0.034 
DW  2.15 2.10 2.12 2.03 2.22 2.19  1.69 
Number  of  observations  481 481 463 463 481 481  439 
Number  of  countries  included  20 20 20 20 20 20  18 
aTwenty countries: the countries of footnote 2 without Luxembourg, Switzerland and Turkey. 
bEstimated without Australia and New Zealand. 
Note: t-values are given in parentheses. 
***/**/* indicate significance of 1/5/10 per cent. Will Fiscal Drag Survive? 
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regressions are based on percentage changes. Furthermore, testing for separate 
effects of real growth and inflation could be burdened by the problem of 
multicollinearity, since theoretical arguments suggest a close relation between 
these variables. Fortunately, estimating (2') in changes is not seriously affected 
by this problem: correlations between inflation and real growth in the sample 
turn out to be sufficiently low (the country average for growth inflation 
correlations — absolute values — is 0.23; no single correlation coefficient is 
larger than 0.6 in absolute value). 
Table 4 summarises the regression results for different kinds of taxes for the 
OECD as a whole (20 countries: the countries of footnote 2 without 
Luxembourg, Switzerland and Turkey, over the period 1972–96). Low adjusted 
R
2s reflect the fact that the regressions are based on changes in variables. The 
signs of the partially significant control variables are as expected: rising 
globalisation and unemployment tend to decrease, and rising relative prices of 
government output tend to increase, taxes. The unemployment effect is reversed 
in the case of corporate income taxes. The fiscal preference proxy (population 
density) and the demography variable are largely insignificant. 
Turning to the central variables of interest that represent fiscal drag, the 
following picture emerges. Judging from the total tax regression, both types of 
fiscal drag work in a significant way: real growth and inflation have a positive 
impact on the tax–GDP ratio for the OECD as a whole. The results for the 
different types of taxes clearly correspond to the theoretical reasoning above. In 
particular, the opposite signs of the inflation effect for corporate and individual 
income tax are as expected. Individual income taxes show the largest positive 
impact of inflation on tax revenues, followed by social security contributions. 
Thus, the hints from the descriptive analysis are confirmed with regard to social 
security contributions, which show a similar inflation effect to that for individual 
income tax. The result for corporate income taxes — a negative impact of 
inflation on the tax ratio — underlines the relevance of the Olivera–Tanzi effect. 
The inflationary impact on indirect taxes is surprising. Obviously, an inflationary 
environment is favourable for increasing taxes on goods and services — 
although the effect is only half the size of the effect for individual income tax. 
Inflation is neutral in the case of property taxation. 
These results allow us to classify taxes for the OECD as a whole in the 
scheme developed above, as shown in Table 5, which is based on effects that are 
significant at the 10 per cent level or better. This classification also shows that 
real growth is particularly useful in expanding tax revenues from corporate and 
individual income taxes. 
In the next step, the focus shifts to country differences. It is likely that de 
facto indexation and the real growth elasticity of taxes differ between national 
tax systems. A slight modification of the panel regression allows us to explore  
 Fiscal Studies 
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TABLE 5 
Classifying Taxes for the OECD as a Whole 
    Nominal fiscal drag 
   Absent Negative  Positive 
Absent  Property taxes  —  Social security contributions 
Negative  —  —  Taxes on goods and services 
Real 
fiscal 
drag  Positive  —  Corporate income taxes  Individual income taxes 
 
individual country characteristics. For that purpose, regression equation (2') is 
replaced by the following panel estimation, in which β  and ϑ   incorporate 
individual country coefficients, and the individual fixed effects are replaced by a 
common intercept: 
(2")  ln ln ln ln  
it it





αβ ϑ γ =+ + + + . 
Again, this specification can be estimated for different tax categories with the 
details of the specification (changes instead of levels, lagged explanatory 
variables) identical to those for the regressions depicted in Table 4. Each 
combination of country and type of tax is classified according to the significance 
of the country-specific β  and ϑ  (significance at the 10 per cent level or better). 
The results for total taxes and for both types of income taxation are summarised 
in Tables 6–8. (The underlying regression results can be obtained from the 
author.) 
In these classifications, again, the fundamental difference between corporate 
and individual income taxes shows up. There is no country where inflation 
reduces individual income taxes, whereas this is so for nine countries in the case 
of corporate taxation. Real growth boosts the individual income tax ratio in a 
significant way only in Japan and the Netherlands, whereas this is so for 11 out 
of 20 countries in the case of corporate taxation. 
Comparing countries with regard to their inflation elasticities of total 
taxation, there are seven countries where inflation has a positive and significant 
impact on the tax–income ratio. It should be noted that, among these seven, there 
are six Euro member countries. Twelve countries seem to be characterised by 
perfect de facto indexation since inflation does not have an impact on tax ratios. 
Ireland is the only example with de facto overindexation: in this country, real 
growth boosts tax revenues while purely nominal growth reduces the tax ratio. 
It is possible that the degree of indexation changes over the course of time. 
As suggested by the theoretical considerations above, experience of high 
inflation may increase awareness of the real consequences of inflation in the 
fiscal system and thus lead to de facto indexation. In the 1970s, inflation rates in  
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TABLE 6 
Classification for Total Taxes including Social Security 
    Nominal fiscal drag   
   Absent Negative  Positive  Sum 
Absent  AUS, AUT, CAN, 
GBR, GER, GRC, 
NLD, SWE 
—  BEL, ESP, FIN, 
FRA, ITA, NZL, 
PRT 
15 


















Positive  DNK, JPN, NOR, 
USA 
IRE —  5 
  Sum  12 1  7  20 
Note: For abbreviations, see footnote 2. 
 
TABLE 7 
Classification for Individual Income Taxes 
    Nominal fiscal drag   
   Absent Negative  Positive  Sum 
Absent  AUS, AUT, CAN, 
DNK, GBR, GER, 
GRC, NOR, PRT, 
USA 
—  BEL, ESP, FIN, 
FRA, IRE, ITA, 
NZL, SWE 
18 


















Positive  JPN, NLD  —  —  2 
  Sum  12 0  8  20 
Note: For abbreviations, see footnote 2. 
 
TABLE 8 
Classification for Corporate Income Taxes 
    Nominal fiscal drag   
   Absent Negative  Positive  Sum 
Absent  AUS, BEL, ESP, 
FRA, GER, ITA, 
SWE 
NLD, NZL  —  9 


















Positive  DNK, GRC, NOR, 
PRT 
AUT, CAN, FIN, 
GBR, IRE, JPN, 
USA 
— 11 
  Sum  11 9  0  20 
Note: For abbreviations, see footnote 2. 
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FIGURE 1 
ϑϑϑϑ   for Seven-Year Rolling Regressions, with Confidence Bands of Two Standard 
Deviations: Regression Specification (2') for Individual Income Taxes 
1975
–1.5







1987 1989 1991  
 
OECD countries on average more than doubled in comparison with the second 
half of the 1960s (see Table 1). This new experience might have induced 
changes in the de jure indexation procedures or at least the de facto indexation 
behaviour. Being made more alert by an inflationary decade, voters might have 
forced politicians to correct more frequently for the consequences of phenomena 
such as bracket creep. 
In order to check for changes in de facto indexation over the course of time, a 
rolling regression technique is applied. Starting with the period 1972–78, 
equation (2') was estimated for consecutive seven-year periods up to 1990–96. 
Figure 1 shows for individual income taxes — the tax category with the largest 
inflation elasticity — the resulting coefficient ϑ . ϑ  is shown for the central year 
of each seven-year regression period together with the two-standard-deviation 
bands. 
There are clear indications that ϑ  has changed after the inflationary 
experience of the 1970s. In the 1970s, fiscal policy was able to exploit inflation 
in increasing tax burdens, since the coefficient remained in the significant 
positive range throughout this decade. This ability seems to have changed 
gradually over the 1980s. This was a plausible development in the light of the 
theory: voters noticed more and more that their nominal assessment of the tax 
burden was a mistake; as a consequence, political pressure to adjust tax tables 
for inflation increased. Thus, since the middle of the 1980s, nominal fiscal drag Will Fiscal Drag Survive? 
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in income taxation for the OECD as a whole declined and ϑ  left the significant 
range. 
VI. POLICY CONCLUSIONS 
For the OECD as a whole, inflation affects real tax revenues. Inflation is 
particularly helpful in increasing revenues from individual income taxes and 
social security contributions. While the former does not come as a surprise (due 
to the well-known bracket-creeping effects), the latter is a new insight. Although 
social security contributions in many countries do not grow automatically with 
inflation, it seems to be politically easier to increase contribution ceilings and 
rates in an inflationary environment. These results hint at the relevance of money 
illusion in the context of taxation. Voters might be more willing to accept a 
growing real tax and social security burden if their net income does not decrease 
in nominal terms. Contrary to the case of individual income taxes, rising price 
levels tend to reduce the proceeds from corporate income taxes. For total tax 
revenues, the positive effects dominate. Thus, the starting question of the paper 
can be answered affirmatively: declining inflation rates are among the factors 
explaining less buoyant tax revenue growth in recent years. 
From the European perspective, it is striking that six out of seven countries 
with nominal fiscal drag are EMU member countries. This fact has delicate 
implications with regard to monetary policy preferences in the Euro zone. Fiscal 
politicians in the Euro zone benefit more from inflation in terms of increasing 
real tax receipts than their colleagues in non-EMU OECD countries. Among the 
cases with significant nominal fiscal drag, there are such important EMU 
countries as France and Italy. In these countries, tax interests add to the well-
known seigniorage interests of fiscal politicians with regard to inflation. Thus, 
political pressure towards inflationary monetary policy could be more 
pronounced in the case of the European Central Bank (ECB) than, for example, 
in the cases of the US Federal Reserve or the Bank of England, whose countries’ 
tax systems are inflation-neutral. This sheds an interesting light on repeated 
attempts — for example, on the part of French politicians — to install a political 
counterweight against the ECB at the European level. At least implicitly, the 
wish to ease constraints for government revenues might be among the driving 
motives. 
The results also confirm that the absence of de jure indexation procedures 
does not necessarily lead to nominal fiscal drag. Germany is an important 
example of this case: in spite of the absence of any automatic indexation and the 
existence of a progressive income tax system, there are no hints of fiscal drag, 
according to the above analysis. Obviously, regular discretionary adjustment of 
tax tables has, to a certain extent, neutralised the impact of inflation in Germany. 
This shows that de facto indexation can be achieved, if the political process 
reacts sufficiently sensitively to inflation. Fiscal Studies 
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It is a well-established characteristic of inflation that it has the strongest real 
effects if it comes as a surprise. The econometric analysis has repeated this 
insight for bracket-creeping effects. While it was easy to exploit inflation fiscally 
in the 1970s when voters had no experience of inflation, it has become more 
difficult since. However, preconditions for nominal fiscal drag could again 
become more favourable after some years of price stability. After years of very 
low inflation rates, voters might again start to regard the nominal view as 
resulting in sufficiently reasonable judgements. This would be the moment when 
money illusion could again be exploited by fiscal policy. This danger is 
particularly relevant in countries where indexation works on a de facto basis 
with the help of discretionary adjustments. Countries with automatic indexation 
are naturally less prone to fiscal drag, even with renewed money illusion on the 
part of voters. 
Given that a democratic fiscal system should reflect voters’ preferences, a 
declining role for nominal fiscal drag is a welcome development. The normative 
assessments of the nominal and real types of fiscal drag are very different. The 
real type of fiscal drag could result from voters’ preferences — for example, for 
a positive income elasticity of demand for public goods. In contrast, it is hard to 
relate nominal fiscal drag to voters’ preferences. As argued above, it rather 
originates from money illusion and a lack of economic rationality. Thus, there is 
the danger that nominal fiscal drag is politically abused.  
The above classification of tax categories can also be related to recent OECD 
tax reforms. These reforms are characterised by shifting tax burdens away from 
direct taxation and social security contributions towards indirect taxes. The 
results of this study allow us to draw conclusions about the future growth and 
inflation elasticities of reformed tax systems. 
The real growth elasticity of tax ratios should decline with these reforms, as 
can easily be motivated by Table 5: indirect taxation (negative elasticity to real 
growth) replaces tax sources with zero or positive elasticity. In future, tax–
income ratios will therefore be less growth-elastic. 
The impact of reforms on inflation elasticity is less clear, since there are 
countervailing effects. The reduction of corporate income taxes with a 
significant Olivera–Tanzi effect increases the inflation elasticity of the system as 
a whole. The opposite effect results from the fact that indirect taxation reacts 
less to inflation than both individual income taxes and social security 
contributions. This tends to decrease nominal fiscal drag. 
Summing up, the combination of low inflation rates and changing structural 
characteristics of OECD tax systems feeds the forecast that fiscal drag becomes 
less powerful. This can also be stated in the context of Wagner’s Law: 
government expenditures can only grow as far as additional revenues are 
available. Assuming that other sources, such as deficit finance or privatisation 
proceeds, are exhausted in most countries, taxes are crucial. This study indicates Will Fiscal Drag Survive? 
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increasing marginal political costs of tax finance. This tends to restrict the scope 




Tax data  OECD Revenue Statistics, 1965–97 
   
Real GDP 
Private consumption deflator 
Government consumption deflator 
Unemployment rate 
Working-age population 
OECD, Fiscal Positions and Business Cycles, June 2000 
   
Openness = (Exports + Imports) / GDP 
Population 
IMF, International Financial Statistics, 2000 
   
Country size  CIA World Factbook, 2000 
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